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This paper abandons one of the simplifying assumptions in the standard
formulation of search models in the economic literature by assuming that
the number of economic agents in the model is large but ¯nite. By explicitly
treating the fraction of the number of agents of one type (employed, say) as
a random variable rather than a deterministic number, the paper simpli¯es
the analysis associated with the analysis of cycles, and calculates variances
of the fraction as well.
We derive the probability distribution of the fraction by solving a (back-
ward) Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, i.e., the master equation and solved
it approximately in terms of power series expansion in terms of N¡1=2 where
N is the number of agents in the model.
We show that in models with several locally stable equilibria asymmet-
rical cycles exist, and derives variances of the fraction about locally stable
equilibria in stationary states. What is important to notice is the ease with
which cycles can be established and °uctuations characterized when the num-
ber of participants are kept ¯nite at the beginning and later let it approach
in¯nity if desired, rather than assuming it to be in¯nite from the beginning.
Key words: Search model, Master equations, Fokker-Planck equations,
Fluctuations, Asymmetrical cycles
11 Introduction
The search model of Diamond (1982), and its elaboration in Diamond and
Fudenberg (1989) have been in°uential, as evidenced by frequent citations in
the search literature. By casting their model in a setting with an in¯nitely
many agents, however, their dynamic analysis is necessarily deterministic,
and totally abstracted from °uctuations of the fraction, which could be sub-
stantial and important in real life.
We re-examine their model in a framework of a large but a ¯nite number
of agents.1 We have two objectives in recasting the original model this way:
One to obtain information on °uctuations about the equilibria, and the other
to provide a simpler explanation than Diamond and Fudenberg for cyclical
behavior. Dynamic behavior of the model is now described by the backward
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, or what is called the master equation in the
physics and ecology literature.2 It describes how the probabiity for the frac-
tion evolves with time. This master equation is then approximately solved to
yield two equations: one is an ordinary di®erential equation for the average or
expected value of the fraction of the employed. The other is a partial di®eren-
tial equation, known as the Fokker-Planck equation, for random deviations of
the fraction about the mean. When we let the number of agents go to in¯nity
the equation for the mean reproduces the equation for the fraction derived
by Diamond. The Fokker-Planck equation is new. The critical points of the
ordinary di®erential equation, and the endogenously determined reservation
cost expression jointly yield information on the equilibria, and asymmetrical
cyclical behavior.
Our approach allows us to draw more natural conditions than in Diamond
and Fudenberg under which the model exhibits asymmetric cyclical behavior
similar to business cycles. Fluctuations about aggregate dynamics occur in
our analysis because micro-shocks intrinsic in our models do not vanish when
the number of agents in the model is ¯nite. In our setting arrivals of pro-
duction and trading opportunities are stochastic. With positive probabilities
net e®ects do not vanish but accumulate to change the fraction of employed
from one basin of attraction to the other.3
1This example was suggested by J.M. Orszak as one of his comments on Chapter 5 in
Aoki (1996).
2See Aoki (1996, Sec. 5.1) or van Kampen (1992, p.97) for the source of this name.
3The idea of micro-shock creating aggregate risk is pointed out by Jovanovic (1987).
His main point is that in the nonlinear systems micro-shocks intrinsic in the model do not
vanish. Kirman (1993) discusses a mechanism of stochastic cycles. The focus of his model
is on herding e®ects. See Aoki (1998, p.436) for comparison of our method and that of
Kirman. Furthermore, our model in this paper has optimizing agents. In such a model
°uctuations among two basins of attractions are still possible.
11.1 Model
There is a large but a ¯nite number, N, of agents,4 who are in one of two
possible states, employed and unemployed. Of the N agents in the model,
n of them are employed, and N ¡ n are unemployed. The state of the
collection of the N agents is n, or equivalently the fraction e = n=N. Each
of the N ¡ n unemployed persons independently encounters a production
opportunity which appears at the rate of a¢t in a small time interval ¢t. If
the opportunity is accepted, it yields the unit output and at the cost c, where
c is a nonnegative random number with a known distribution function G.
There is a reservation or threshold cost c¤(n), to be determined endogenously
below, above which the opportunity is rejected as being too costly. When the
opportunity is accepted, the person's status changes from being unemployed
to employed. Each of n employed persons independently encounters a trading
opportunity at the rate b(n=N) per unit time. When an employed person
encounters a trading opportunity he forms a pair with another randomly
selected employed person, and the pair trade and each of the pair consumes
the output of the partner to receive instantaneous utility v and their status
changes to being unemployed from employed. See Diamond (1982) for some
explanations for these assumptions.
Let We(n;t) be the present discounted value of lifetime utility of an em-
ployed person, and let Wu(n;t) be that of an unemployed when the state is
n. Because n is a random variable in this paper, we take the expectation of
these random value functions later after we derive the stationary distribution
of n. We drop t from the argument of the value functions because dynamic
programing involves in¯nite horizon and the problem is time-homogeneous.
The value functions are evaluated in Sec. 5 below after we discuss the dy-
namics for the mean of the fraction and a Fokker-Planck equation for the
°uctuations about the mean in Section 3 and 4. In the next Section 2 we
discuss the transition rates of the underlying stochastic process. Section 7
discusses ¯rst passage times between two locally stable equilibria when the
model dynamics have multiple locally stable equilibria. The paper concludes
with Section 8.
2 Transition Rates
We model the problem as a jump Markov process. Thus, the model is com-
pletely speci¯ed by the transition rates whch describe movements of agents
over a small interval of time.
To an unemployed agent production opportunities arrrive at the rate a as
a Poisson process. Each production opportunity if undertaken yields a unit of
output with cost c. Only production with cost c¤ or less will be undertaken.
4We take N to be a large ¯xed number. It is straightforward to let N be random. See
Kelly (1979) for example.
2The transition rate from n to n + 1 is given by (N ¡ n)aG(c¤), where c¤ is
the "reservation" cost in the sense that only the production with cost c · c¤
is undertaken. Since this reservation cost is a choice variable and depends
on n=N we write it as c¤(n=N) or as c¤(n) for short in the following.
For an employed agent trading opportunities arrive as a Poisson process
at the rate ¯(n=N). His probability for being one of the random pair is
1 ¡ Cn¡1;2=Cn;2 = 2=n. We de¯ne the arrival rate of trading opportunity
for an agent to be b(n=N) := (2=n)¯(n=N). While an employed agent waits
for a trading partner, the probability is [Cn¡1;2=Cn;2]¯ = [(n ¡ 2)=2]¯ that
a pair involving other employed agents trade, thus decreasing n to n ¡ 2.
In aggregate, then, the transition rate from state n to n ¡ 2 is given by
(n=2)b(n=N).
3 Aggregate Dynamics: Dynamics for the Mean
of the Fraction
The master equation (see Aoki (1996, Sec. 5.1)) is
dpn(t)=dt = rn¡1pn¡1(t) + ln+2pn+2(t) ¡ (rn + ln)pn(t);
with obvious boundary conditions imposed at n at 0 and N, and near these
values as shown in Section 5.
From our prvious discussion
rn = (N ¡ n)aG(c










Since this equation cannot be solved exactly we proceed as in Aoki (1996, p.








The variable Á is the expected fraction of employed and » represents ran-
dom °uctuations about the mean. This scaling implies that °uctuations are
expected to be of the order of
p
N.5 In this change of variables, note that
(n + 1)=N = Á + N¡1=2(» + 1=
p
N), and so on. For example , » changes by
2=
p
N in ln+2. Let ¦(»;t) := pn(t). The master equation is now rewritten in
terms of ¦ by noting that
dpn(t)=dt = @¦=@t+ (@¦=@»)(d»=dt);
5That this is the correct order is indicated by the fact that the coe±cients of the





In the Taylor series expansion, after subsituting the change of variables,
we match the left-hand side of the order
p
N with the terms of the same




= ©(Á) := (1 ¡Á)aG(c
¤) ¡ Áb(Á): (1)
This is in agreement with the dynamic equation for e in Diamond, his (1).
Here we de¯ne ©(Á) as above as short-hand because this grouping of terms
arise several times below.
4 Dynamics for the Fluctuations
The rest of terms are for determining the distribution of ». By collecting
terms of order O(N0) in the Taylor series expansion this equation is seen to
be given by







¤) + b(Á) + Áb











This is a type of Fokker-Planck equation which can be solved as discussed
in Aoki (1996, Sec. 5.13), for example. As we discuss shortly, the local
equilibria of the dynamics are the zeros of the function ©. Its derivative ©0
is negative at those local equilibria which are locally asymptotically stable,
i.e., at those locally stable equilibria A is positive. Note that the coe±cient
C = 2Áb(Á) is at the critical points. Eq.(2) can be solved by the method of
separation of variables. Let ¦(»;t) = T(t)X(»). Then we obtain
T
0(t)=T(t) = A+ A»X
0(»)=X(») + CX
00(»)=X(») = ¡µ;
where µ is some constant.












4We have thus shown that this statioanry distribution for » is normally dis-





With two or more locally stable equilibria, the probability mass around
each of the critical points may overlap and assign positive probability to the
neighboring critical points. This is one su±cient condition for °uctuations
to spill over to the neighboring basins of attractions. Even if this does not
happen, we show later that expected ¯rst passage times from one basin to
the neighboring ones are ¯nite, i.e., cycles are possible.
5 Value Functions
Denote the discount rate by r. Value functions depend on the fraction n=N
rather than on n directly. For shorter notation, however, we denote them by
We(n) and Wu(n) for the employed and unemployed when the number of the
employed is n. For an employed agent, we obtain the relation for the value
functions as
rWe(n) = b(n=N)[v + Wu(n ¡ 2) ¡ We(n)] + (N ¡ n)aG(c




b(n=N)[We(n ¡ 2) ¡ We(n)]









b(n=N)[Wu(n ¡ 2) ¡ Wu(n)];
for n = 2;3;:::;N ¡ 1. There are boundary relations which we do not use,
but mention here for completeness:





rWe(n) = (N ¡ n)aG
¤(n)[We(n + 1) ¡ We(n)];
for n = 1;2, where G¤(n) := G(c¤(n)). Finally
rWu(n) = aG
¤ + (N ¡ n ¡ 1)aG
¤(n)[Wu(n + 1) ¡ Wu(n)];
6The probability intensity for the transition from state n to state n+1 is (N ¡n)aG¤,
where G¤ is short-hand for G(c¤), of which (N ¡ n ¡ 1)aG¤ is the intensity for other
unemployed agents to become employed, while he remains unemployed. The intensity for
him to become employed is aG¤.
5for n = 0;1.
We next take the expected values of these value functions with respect
to the stationary distributions of n. By changing variables as done in Sec. 3
we show below that the stationary distribution for » is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance which is a function of Á but is independent
of N. This is a posteriori justi¯cation for the change of variables we have
performed.
Rather than obtaining optimal sequences of the reservation costs from
the set of equations displayed above, we ¯rst derive the expressions for the
expected values of the value functions and then derive the expression for the
reservation costs as functions of Á up to terms of order O(1=N).
5.1 Expected Value Functions
In this section we take the expected values of the value functions earlier
derived.



























Noting that E» = 0, and E»2 = ¾2, the expected value function becomes,
after dropping terms of the order 1=N or less we arrive at
rVu(Á) = aG
¤[Ve(Á) ¡ Vu(Á)] ¡ a^ c + ©(Á)V
0
u(Á): (3)
Proceeding analogously, and dropping terms of the order O(1=N) or
smaller
rVe(Á) = b(Á)[v + Vu(Á) ¡ Ve(Á)] + ©(Á)V
0
e(Á): (4)
Details of algebra is in Appendix.
These two equations correspond with (4a) and (4b) in Diamond and Fu-
denberg.
Making use of the fact that ©(Áe) = 0, where Áe denote locally stable
equilibrium points, (3) and (4) yield equilibrium value functions
Ve(Áe) =
(r + aG¤)b(Áe)v ¡ab(Ác)^ c




ab(Áe)G¤v ¡ a(r + b(Áe))^ c
r[r + b(Áe + aG¤]
;
where G¤ and ^ c are evaluated at Áe.
As they pointout, by subtracting (5) from (4), and setting c¤(Á) = Ve(Á)¡
Vu(Á), the reservation cost is given implicitly by
rc









where the last term is recognized as dc¤=dt) = (dc¤=dt)(dÁ=dt).
Thus, the analogy with the case of in¯nite number of agents holds.
We can actually see that this choice of c¤ is optimal by di®erentiating the
expected value functions with respect to c¤, noting that b(Á) is exogenously
speci¯ed and its derivative with respect to c¤ is zero. Solving for the deriva-
tives of the expected value functions with respect to c¤ we see that they are
both zero. This is the ¯rst order condition for optimality. The second order
condition may be shown to hold by taking derivatives once more.
6 Multiple Equilibria and Cycles: An Exam-
ple
To give the basic idea behind construction of models with several equilibria
here is an example with two locally stable equilibria.
We take b(Á) = aÁ to simplify algebra. We also let r=a be denoted by
r, that is we normalize both b and r by a. Suppose that there are two
possible costs: 0 = c1 · c2, that is the distribution function G(c) is a step
function; G(c1) = p > 0;G(c2) = 1: The right-hand side of the dynamics for
the aggregate equation (1) is either ©1(Á) = a[(1 ¡ Á)p ¡ Á2], or ©2(Á) =
a[1¡Á¡Á2] depending on the range of the argument Á. We show below that
©1 applies when Á is not greater than Ã, and above it ©2 prevails.
There are thus two critical points. They are the roots of ©i(Á) = 0,
i = 1;2, and are given by
Á1 = [
q




5 ¡ 1]=2 := ·:
We see that ©0
i(Ái) are negative for i = 1;2, that is, the critical points are
locally stable.
From the optimality condition, c¤
1 = c¤(Á1) is determined by
rc
¤









r + Á1 + p
;
7if 0 < c¤
1 < c2.
The second value c¤
2 = c¤(Á2) is determined by
rc
¤









Á1v + c2(1 ¡ p)
r + Á2 + 1
;
if c2 < c¤
2.





where we assume that v > c2, that is the value of © undergoes a discontinous




See Fig. 1 Therefore, if there is a large positive disturbance near Á1
which makes the variable Á to cross the boundary at Ã, then the derivative
is positive and the disturbance is ampli¯ed and Á is attracted to Á2. Con-
versely a large negative disturbance near Á2 will cause the state variable to
be attracted to Á1.
The conditions to ensure 0 · Á1 < Ã < Á2 · 1 are
c2 <
v·
r + p + ·
;
and q
p2 + p=2 < p=2 + c2(r + p)=(v2 ¡ c2):
Thus a small p and not too large c2 will su±ce to satisfy these conditions.
The same construction works with three critical points although condi-
tions on the parameters are more complicated to state. The critical points are
determined as functions of p1 = G(0) and p1+p2 = G(c2), where 0 = c1 < c2.
At c3 > c2 G(c3) = 1. We ensure that ci < c¤(Ái) < ci+1 holds, i = 1;2, and
c3 < c¤
3.
We now have possibilities of the total of three cycles; between Á1 and
Á2,Á2 and Á3, but also between Á1 and Á3.
7 Concluding Discussion
We have re-examined the Diamond search model for the case of a ¯nite
number of agents, that is, by not assuming an in¯nite number of agents from
the beginning. With a ¯nit number of agents, the fraction of employed agents
8is a random variable which °uctuates about its mean value. We have derived
that the °uctuations are of the form »=
p
N where N is the total number of
agents, and the distribution function for » is Gaussian with mean and ¯nite
variance which is a function of the expected fraction of the employed agents.
We have shown via a simple example that the model can have several locally
stable equilibria and that the fraction of the employed agents may °uctuate
between the pair of equilibria. We have shown that this leads to a simpler
explanations of asymmetrical cycles, among others.
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Appendix
The Master equation is given by,
dPn(t)
dt




















cn can be considered as a function for n=N. Hence we can write cn = c(n=N).
Moreover, we have n=N = Á + »=
p
N. Also, setting Pn(t) = ¦(»;t) and
through Taylor expansions of functions b(¢), c(¢), and ¦(»;t) we can rewrite






































































































































































































































































































N + f[aG(c) + b + Áb
0 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)aG
0c
0]¦
+[aG + b + Áb















The comparison of ther term with order
p




= (1 ¡ Á)aG(c(Á)) ¡ Áb(Á):








where A = aG(c) + b + Áb0 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)aG0c0 and C = (1 ¡ Á)aG=2 + Áb.
Next, rewrite the system of equations for We, Wu and c in terms of average
of n=N, Á. With new notations for value functions introduced in section 4,







































































































where c¤ = c¤(Á) and c¤0 = c¤0(Á). Taking expectations of above over », we get
the following equation (note that » = 0 and »2 are zero and ¾2 respectively);


















































































































aG ¢ (V 0




where ^ c =
R c¤(Á)
























Again, by taking expectation about » we get,
c
¤(Á) = Ve(Á) ¡ Vu(Á) + O(N
¡1):
Now, take the di®erence between rVe and rVu, we get
r(Ve ¡ Vu)























11Substituting the relationships c¤ = Ve ¡ Vu + O(N¡1) and c¤0 = V 0
e ¡ V 0
u +
O(N¡1) into above, we get
rc
¤ = b(v ¡ c
¤) ¡ a(Gc
¤ ¡ ^ c) + [(1 ¡ Á)aG(c
¤) ¡ Áb(Á)]c
¤0;
where the terms of order less than N¡1 are omitted here.
The pair (c¤(Á);Á) at the critical point is determined by the equations,
rc
¤ = b(Á)(v ¡ c
¤) ¡a(G(c
¤)c
¤ ¡ ^ c) + [(1 ¡ Á)aG(c
¤) ¡ Áb(Á)]c
¤0 and
0 = (1 ¡Á)aG(c
¤(Á)) ¡ Áb(Á):
12